Repressive apparatus and control over the population in North Korea

This article is specifically written for this collection.

One of the characteristic features of the North Korean society is a comprehensive state control, which concerns all parties to the lives of Korean. Apparently, there will be no particular exaggeration to say that North Korea is the most controlled society of the modern world. In this article, I would like to dwell both on the history and modern methods of administrative and police control over the population in North Korea. The boundaries of this topic are quite vague, especially since the concept "Political control" very widely and, in addition, it is difficult to carry out a clear line between, say, administrative-police and economic control (deprivation of cards, for example, by solving the local administration – to which area it applies?). Nevertheless, we will try to stay on those control methods that are repressive and related to the activities of the police apparatus. The main sources were the information collected by the author during the conversations with the North Koreans both in the DPRK itself and beyond, and South Korean publications, also for the most part relying on messages.

Unfortunately, these information is incomplete and often contradictory (and often, even consciously falsified), but, nevertheless, the topic is so interesting that it makes sense to pre-examine it even on the basis of these obviously scarce and, sometimes, not very hopeless sources. Generally speaking, the study of the repressive apparatus in non-democratic societies is inevitably faced with one paradoxical pattern: the more effective and tougher control over the population, the less the outside world knows about the repressions there. Sometimes it leads to unexpected results: when any regime begins to soften the police control, that is, in other words, to refer to his subject softer, unhappy appears not only the opportunity to say something, but also be heard outside the country. Therefore, from the point of view of a third-party observer, this mitigation is often accompanied by wave of critical publications in a foreign press, and may even be perceived as "deterioration", and not an improvement in the situation. A good example of this is China. When at the beginning of the seventies, Maoszedunovsky terror reached his peak, information about torture, shooting, prisons almost never penetrated to Western printing. When the regime immeasurably softened, and when quite real (and not fabricated by the political police) dissidents got the opportunity to communicate with foreign journalists, Western press suddenly turned out to be completed by publications about "Human Rights in China". Something similar happened in the USSR in two ten decades earlier, when the reforms of Khrushchev made opposition activity possible (in both cases, the element of conscious political manipulation was also played by the element of conscious political manipulation "Problems of human rights" To achieve certain political goals, but this is another side of the medal).

The DPRK, to the misfortune of most of its inhabitants, is still at the stage of total political and information control, with all the consequences that arise from here, including – and the lack of objective information about how control over the population is carried out.

At first, the structure of the North Korean repressive-police apparatus was under the strong Soviet influence, with the direct participation of immigrants from the USSR and sent Moscow advisers who worked in the Korean Ministry of the Interior, until the end of the 1950s. [1]. True specific methods of administrative and police control over the population, characteristic of the DPRK, appeared only in the late 1950s., When the period of unconditional follows in the fairway of Soviet politics remained behind, and largely related to the influence of the political culture of Maoist China. A sharp tightening of control over the population began in North Korea since the late 1950s., That is, since the time when the faction of Kim Il Sang, dealt with his real and potential rivals, captured the full power in the country. It is since then that North Korea, who before, was not a blooming democracy, begins to turn into a totally controlled society, in which the authorities seek to interfere with absolutely in all directions of life of their subjects. May 30, 1957. The Permanent Committee (Politburo) of the Central Committee of the TPK decided under the long name: "On the transformation of the fight against counter-revolutionary elements in the nationary, the All-partition Movement" (T.N."Decision of May 30"). This decision was the beginning of one of the first major campaigns to identify the enemies of the regime. At first, the campaign "Transformation of the fight against counter-revolutionary elements in the nationary, all-party movement" It was sluggish and sharply activated only in 1959., When the TPK Central Committee was created a special body for managing it. At the head of this body, the younger brother Kim Il Sayna – Kim N Zhu, who at that time was one of the highest party functionaries. Similar organs, which included up to 7,000 people, were created in the party committees of lower level2 0 [14, with.310].

During this campaign, the entire population of North Korea was first divided into 3 groups: "hostile forces", "Neutral forces" and "Friendly forces". This three-membered division is preserved and so. TO "hostile forces" were: 1) family of south of the south; 2) former landowners, entrepreneurs, merchants and servants of the cult, as well as their families; 3) not returned to the north prisoners and members of their families; 4) Former employees of the Japanese colonial administration and their families; 5) families of persons serving imprisonment, as well as the former prisoners themselves; 6) "Fractions" (that is, those members of the party, which opposed the actions of Kim Il Senya), and their families. TO "Friendly forces" were: 1) families of the dead revolutionaries; 2) families of the dead servicemen; 3) Personnel workers and their families. The rest of the population fell, naturally, in a category "neutral forces".

So the foundation was laid, in fact – the estate division of the population on unequal and hereditary categories, which was the characteristic feature of the political organization of the North Korean society. This system has developed under the explicit influence of Maoist China, where from the late 50s. There were also similar quasi-visual groups of the population, however, in Korea, this division, firstly, was much more fractional, and, secondly, it existed for a much longer time.

During the campaign 1957-1960. there was a considerable amount "malicious counter-revolutionaries", who appeared before the court. About 2500 people were executed, and it was at this time that the executions began to be carried out in public, many were softer punishments. Part of the campaign was the resolution of the Council of Ministers NO.149, adopted on the basis of the already mentioned "Decisions on May 30". In accordance with this resolution, persons related to "hostile forces", Laugh for the right to live in the border and seaside areas (at a distance less than 20 km from the border or coastline), as well as at a distance less than 50 km from Pyongyang and Cason, and less than 20 km away – from any other major city. If you consider that North Korea is not too big country, then this decree actually meant eviction "hostile elements" In the poor mountain northern provinces, where special areas were created to accommodate them. In total, during the resolution of NO. 149, which remains in strength and today (at least in the late 80s. it was still active) in the mountainous areas, according to South Korean data, was evicted for permanent residence of about 70 thousand people [14, with. 312]. I must say that in this case we may have a deal with direct Soviet influence, since the whole system is very reminded by the notorious "101 km" (existing at that time in the USSR system, in accordance with which the facial and other unlawful elements released from the conclusion and other unreliable elements had the right to live no closer to 101 km from Moscow, Leningrad and other major cities).

By early 1961. Campaign to identify and eviction "Counter-revolutionary elements" successfully ended. However, a sharp activation of military preparations in the early 1960s. And the continuing tightening of the internal policy of Kimirsenovsky regime required a new, more thorough, verification of the population for loyalty. This check has begun in 1964. In accordance with the decision "On further strengthening of work with various layers and groups of the population" adopted by the eighth plenum of the Central Committee of the TPK of the fourth convocation at the end of February. The ruling was prescribed to hold a new redistribution of the population by category, and the new one (not as in 1957-1960.) and significantly more fractional. This work was carried out in 1964-1969. Forces so-called "Groups 620", specially formed for this purpose. As in 1957-1960., This activity was accompanied by senders, arrests and executions of the enemies of the regime (both real and potential or simply fictional). The campaign was completed by the establishment of a new system of separation of the entire population of North Korea into groups. This system with some changes is valid to the present, so it should be part more.

The entire population of the DPRK, depending on its origin, is divided into 51 groups that form three layers: "basic", "hesitating" and "hostile".

TO "Basic layula" The following 12 groups include: 1) workers, immigrants from working families; 2) immigrants from peasant-bathers; 3) immigrants from poor peasants; 4) employees of government agencies; 5) members of the TPK; 6) Family members who died in battles of the participants of the revolutionary struggle; 7) family members of the deceased participants of the revolutionary and national liberation movement; 8) revolutionary intellectuals (that is, such intelligents who have received education after liberation); 9) families of civilians killed during the war; 10) families of soldiers who killed in the Korean War; 11) family of military personnel; 12) war heroes.

TO "Irrigible layula" 9 groups include: 13) Former petty traders; 14) former average merchants; 15) former artisans; 16) former owners of small enterprises; 17) former owners of small service sector enterprises; 18) former owners of medium service sector enterprises; 19) families of persons who left for the south during the Korean War, but at the same time did not commit any actions against the North Korean political and state system; 20) former peasants-middle peasants; 21) Suites from the south who did not participate in the so-called "Fractional activity" (that is, simply not related to the communist movement in South Korea).

As you should expect, the most fractional classification exists for people whom the current North Korean regime refers to "hostile layer". There are no many 30 species of enemies:

22) workers with a complex social origin, that is, those people who, although they became workers after liberation, before that were entrepreneurs or officials; 23) Former fists, that is, peasants who used employees in their farms; 24) former merchants represented by national small and medium capital; 25) Former landowners, that is, those who owned to the land reform 1946. more than 5 chonbo (1 chonbo = 0.99 hectares) of land; 26) Persons engaged in prostiponic or pro-American activities; 27) Former reactionary officials who served in the Japanese colonial administration; 28) families of persons with good social origins who committed criminal actions and fled to the south during the war; 29) families of persons with alien social origin who fled to the south during the war; 30) Returning in the 1950s. From China in Korea, Chinese Koreans; 31) Returning in the 1960s. from Japan to Korea Japanese Koreans; 32) southern south non-category.21; 33) the old intelligentsia, which has been educated before liberation; 34) Persons professing Protestantism and Protestant rites fulfilling; 35) Persons confessing Buddhism and executing Buddhist rites; 36) Persons confessing Catholicism and executing Catholic rituals; 37) Local Confucians; 38) persons excluded from TPK; 39) Former personnel workers filmed from posts; 40) persons who served during the occupation of North Korea by the American-South Korean troops in the police and the state apparatus of the south; 41) families of persons serving imprisonment; 42) persons related to spyware organizations and their family members; 43) anti-party, counter-revolutionary, fractional elements; 44) families punished for political crimes; 45) persons freed after serving the sentence of political crimes; 46) persons prone to hooligan actions; 47) "Suspicious women" – Former shamans, Kurtisani Kuben and their closest relatives; 48) persons freed after serving the sentence of the sickness, waste and other economic crimes; 49) Former members of the Party of Young Friends of the Heavenly Way; 50) former members of the Democratic Party; 51) Former capitalists whose property was nationalized in 1946.

The remaining inhabitants of the country are as easy to guess, to "oscillating" Layer. What layer and even to which specifically of these numerous groups belongs to one or another person, has a huge, and sometimes – and determining the influence on his fate. From this depends on work or study, and, it means, the standard of living, the opportunity to live in Pyongyang and other prestigious cities, the severity of the sentence in the event of a court, and much more. For example, representatives "hostile layer" Usually there are no chances to enter the capital’s university, nor live in Pyongyang and Keson. Representatives of the most discriminated groups, as a rule, can find themselves a spouse among comrades in misfortune (the situation known in Maoszedovsky China), which finally turns such groups into closed hereditary caste.

Of course, there is no possibility to even approximately determine the number of these groups. Missing in data on this issue rare. So, in 1986. In one South Korean collective monograph, with reference to the publication of the Ministry of Association (these publications are very rich in facts, but, alas, not references, and it seems often rely on intelligence information) it was announced that the number "Basic","oscillating" and "hostile" layers is 28%, 45% and 27%, respectively [17, with.45]. These figures are at least plausible, and everything would be nothing if in another section of the same collective monograph did not contain, with reference to the American publication, completely different numbers: 25%, 24%, 51% [17, C.105]. Such a scatter once again underlines the fact that there is no other information yet.

R.Kagan, co-author of famous work on human rights in North Korea, said on the 1992 countries held in May. in the United States special hearings Heritage Foundation in the North Korean question, which is the first, "Basic" layer is about 2 million.person., By the second – "oscillating" – About 15 million. And to the third – "hostile" – About 3 million. [4, with.58]. Unfortunately, p. Kagan did not give any links. Us, however, it seems that the number "Basic" layer at r.Kagan is significantly understated, and "oscillating" – On the contrary, overestimated. When considering estimates. Kagan should be remembered that only the number of TPK, all members of which are by definition relate to the main layer in 1980. was as reported on the VI Congress, "2-3 million people" And since then, it is undoubtedly increased. In addition, almost all Pyongyang and Kason residents should be attributed to the main layer, and these are about two million people, partly non-partisan and, thus, only partially included in those mentioned above "2-3 million". In addition, "Basic layer" The families of the servicemen are also a thorough group, considering that the North Korean has more than a million soldiers and officers. So even by the most approximate minimum estimates "Basic layer" can hardly be less than 4-5 million people. Rather, it is significantly higher.

It makes sense to say a few words about the Korean places of imprisonment, without which the effective control of the regime over the population would be unthinkable. All Korean prisons and camps can be divided into two groups: the camps in which politically ungolant elements and political criminals are sent; and "Normal" Camps and prisons containing persons condemned by the court for criminal offenses. From the current information currently, the impression is created that "segregation" between criminal and political criminals is observed in the DPRK sufficiently strictly.

The first type of camps includes the so-called "Regions Resolution NO.149" and "Special areas of dictatorship objects". "Regions Resolution NO.149" (149 Ho Tesan Chick) were created in the late fifties in the northern incomplete provinces after the adoption of the already mentioned decree of the Council of Ministers for NO.149, which provided for evicting unwanted elements to remote mountainous areas. Speed ​​people are not prisoners in the exact sense of the word. Rather, they are in a position resembling the status of Soviet "SPECOVETSELECTS" 30-50s. (It is possible that there was a direct impact here): In the license certificates, they have an appropriate mark, they are obliged to be periodically marked in local public security management, without permission "organs" they can not leave their village or invite someone to themselves. Says to these areas, people are mainly engaged in severe physical work, at least for the reason that there is no other work there. The paradoxicity of the situation is that if our assumptions about the impact of the Stalinist system "SPECOVETSELECTS" on "Resolution No.149" True, then his authors did not have to spend a lot of time on the study of Soviet experience: "Specperters" in 1937-1945. There were most Soviet Koreans, including those who in the late 1950s. Hat a sorrowful posts in the DPRK.

"Special areas of dictatorship objects" were created in the late 1950s. and intended to evict there those related to those or other political crimes. This is an institution (as, by the way, and the term is stranged for our hearing "Objects of dictatorship") – Chinese origin. The mode acting in these areas is much more stricter that exists in "Areas of action NO.149", For they are preferably not potential enemies of the regime, but those who committed certain "Political mistakes", as well as family members of more serious political criminals. According to South Korean data, in the late eighties in the DPRK, there were twelve areas of such districts, with an area of ​​50 to 250 each. The number of living there "Objects of dictatorship" estimated at about 150 thousand. man [16].

Recently, the first reliable information about life in "Special areas of dictatorship objects". This is due to the fact that several former prisoners managed after a while after liberation from the conclusion to run to South Korea. Based on their stories, you can submit to lifestyle, existing in the camps of this type.

In general, the mode in "special districts" Close to prison. The territory of the district is charged with barbed wire and is guarded, which are there people in obligatory should work 12 hours a day, receiving scanties. They, as a rule, live in individual houses or dugouts with their families, can move without a convoy through the district, they are allowed to engage in agriculture.

In one respect, the North Korean regime is far exceeding its prototypes: Stalinsky Soviet Union and Maoszedovsky China. Although Stalin’s words "Son for his father does not answer" and were, in many ways, hypocrisy, and the fate of family members of the repressed in the Soviet Union were unenviable, minor children there were still not sent to the camps. In Korea in "Special district" often hit the whole families, and minor children send there together with parents. So living now in South Korea Kan Chol Chwvan was sent to "Special area of ​​dictatorship objects" Together with his family in 1977., When he was only 7 years old, and was there until February 1987. The cause of his arrest was the conflict between his grandmother’s grandmother, Prishhenyang organization of Japanese Koreans, and the leader of this organization Khan Dock Su. After repatriation, this family, which, among other things, has made considerable money for the construction of the Giant Statue of Kim Il Siena on the Hill of Mansud, in full, fell into the camp. Children in camps are a phenomenon so ordinary that they even act for them, where the political police officers teach (such a school graduated, in particular, Kan Chol Hwan) [18]. Inside themselves "Special districts" There are zones that differ in their regime. It is known about the existence of softer "Revolution zones" And more hard "Absolute control zones". In the last prisoners, in particular, are deprived of the right to live with families and have no chance of liberation [18, C.66].

All these types of camps are interesting in that they are not in the strict sense of the word in places of serving the sentence, because prisoners are often (and perhaps and simply) are sent in them in an extrajudicial manner, one by one by the administrative decision of the authorities. Apparently, the stay in the conclusion is not limited and the release depends solely on the arbitrariness of the authorities.

Convicted on the court, as for criminal offenses, serve a sentence in prisons, which are two species – correctional camps (Khvaso) and correctional labor camps (Nodon Khvaso).

The life of prisons and camps is one of the most closed pages in any totalitarian state. This is especially true of this superholitarian state, how modern North Korea is. During his stay in this country, I drew attention to the fact that Korean propaganda and official art (and the other art there simply does not exist) almost never speak of a court or about prisons. Films about spies and "Fractions" Endes to the fact that the expositible villains are taken away somewhere. The scene of the court, so popular in the Soviet cinema of the Stalinsky times, is a rarity, the prisons are also not said at all.

In the majority of the courts pass (if they pass at all) in the closed order. Open processes – a rare phenomenon, and usually they are indicative. An HC, the former prisoner himself, stated categorically: "Those who have committed political or ideological crimes, [are punished] without trial" [18, with.65]. According to him, the trial is the privilege of criminals. This is perhaps some exaggeration, it is possible that some simplified pseudo-preschool procedure is still carried out (as in the case of arrested in 1967. Venezuelan poet Ali Lamedi), but it is clear that she is completely unlike. On the other hand, in the case of whether Sun OK, accused of a criminal offense, some kind of court really had a place (although the testimony was given under torture) [10a, # 11], which can confirm the application of the HCCA, that in North Korea judged for criminal offenses, while political crimes are punishable in administrative. However, in many ways this conversation is unprecedented, as it is obvious that the court, even if he sometimes happens, is literally minutes and simply approves the sentence prepared by the authorities in advance.

North Korea is one of the few countries on earth, which continues to use public executions wide. Until the 70s, public executions conducted with a large coherence of the people were the usual spectacle at Pyongyang stadiums, but currently such a show are held only in the province. Convictedly tied to the pillar in the center of the sports arena and in the eyes of the audience, reading the sentence, shoot. Among the audience, consistent must be present in obligatory. Sometimes in educational purposes on the execution of universities and students of universities, or even high school students (one of the acquaintances of the author went to public execution in 1984. Together with the whole class).

A characteristic feature of the political terror system in North Korea is the lack of addiction to lush trials, on which opposition leaders should repent in a variety of real or, more often, fictional sins. This addiction, spreading in Europe, apparently, from late-country England, which combined the arbitrariness of the supreme power with a very respectful attitude towards the formal legal norms, was also characteristic of the French revolution, it fell and in many ways oriented the tradition of post-revolutionary Russia. At the same time, the history of North Korea knows only one open political process – Court 1953. Above a number of former leaders of the South Korean underground, who were accused of espionage in favor of the United States and Japan, the preparation of a military coup and a number of others, as fantastic crimes. However, this judicial stage occurred in the period when the Korean leadership in all areas of life, including so delicate, unequivocally focused on the Soviet experience. Developed from the late 50s. Actually, the North Korean elimination style of non-annual, not excluding the most high-ranking, began to provide for their sudden disappearance, after which even relatives could often not learn about the fate of the victims absolutely nothing. However, usually it was a certain way: family members were repressed in most cases themselves went into a link in the already mentioned "Special areas of dictatorship objects".

In this method, there is also nothing new to disappear in this method – it used many dictatorial regimes. However, Korean specificity is that such disappearance does not always turn out to be eternal. In Stalin’s Russia, the sudden disappearance of a prominent policy or a major official almost always meant his arrest and death, but in North Korea, things are somewhat different in. Parties when people who all observers were unanimously considered long dead, reappeared on the North Korean political arena and even again began to play a considerable role there. Especially frequent similar "Resurrection from non-existence" In the second half of the 80s. In this sense, the fate of Pak Zhong E (Pak den Ai) is the Soviet Korean, abandoned in Korea for illegal work Even in the 30s. and subsequently flirting to the side of the Kimirsen fraction. Pak Zhong E adopted the most active participation in the destruction of potential opponents Kim Il Senya, but after the summer 1968. She suddenly disappeared and, it seemed, herself divided their fate. However, after 20 years, in 1986., She reappeared on the Korean political scene. However, after its political "Resurrection" Pak Zhong uh still became what is called, "Wedding General" and did not play an active political or administrative role, which is not able to say about another person with a similar destiny – Chkhve Gvan. In his youth, he took part in the partisan movement, made a big career after his liberation, became the chief of the General Staff, but in February 1969. Was accused B "undermining the authority of the party", Shot from his post and disappeared. However, more than a decade, he suddenly appeared on a secondary post, then he made a career again and in 1988. Returned to that very position with which 20 years before that was expelled, again, becoming the head of the General Staff (and in such an capacity was famous for the formative statements at South Korea). Another example of such a resurrection from political nonsense was the fate of Kim N Zhu, Brother Kim Il Sena, who at one time was even considered as his possible heir. It was he who, by the way, was one of the leaders of the campaign mentioned above against the counter-revolutionary elements that occurred in 1957-1959. In 1975. He disappeared without a trace of political arena (according to rumors, due to the fact that he did not support the starting elevation of Kim Zhong Ira), but in 1993. He appeared again in the North Korean government, and on very noticeable roles. You can also give a number of other examples of the same kind.

Before the beginning of the nineties, the outside world practically did not know anything about what is happening in North Korean prisons. The only source of information was a small brochure of the Venezuelan poet Ali Lameli, who succeeded, having visited the North Korean prison, break out from there to freedom. In the mid-1960s, he worked in Pyongyan the correct corrector emerging there in Spanish literature and in September 1967 was arrested along with another foreigner, his colleague. They were charged with espionage in favor of the United States, apparently, absolutely false. What was the actual reason for the arrest of Ali Lames – to say it is quite difficult, the Korean researchers will understand this eventually, but it is possible that it is so forever and remain secret: in such cases, written evidence is usually not left, and over time will be less chances to find living participants of these events.

After the year of staying in prison, short liberation and new arrest Ali Ledov appeared before the court. As in the interrogations preceding the court, from Ali Lamedi demanded to recognize their guilt and repent. He refused and demanded protection and an open process, but the judge popularly explained him that such requirements are bourgeois, and, of course, rejected them. After the five-minute meeting, the court sentenced Ali Laminder to 20 years in prison as a CIA agent. In prison, however, he spent only 7 years and in 1974 was released as a result of active hassles of various figures – from "International amnesty" to the Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceausescu.

However, the situation began to change at the beginning of the nineties, when several people had passed to the south who had the most direct attitude to the North Korean punitive system. Among them, you can call several former prisoners: An HC (was in the camp in 1987-1989., South ran to the south in 1992), Kan Chol Hwan (hit the camp with a child, on the principle of family responsibility, in 1977-1987., Fight south in 1992), Lee Sun OK (serving a sentence in 1986-1992. In the women’s prison in Cachhone, switched to the south in 1995). Among the ranks was the former guard, the Aclaught of Chol, who in 1987-1994. served in the protection of concentration camps for political prisoners. Their stories allow you to make a fairly complete picture of how the life of the North Korean prison takes.

A picture that arises from their memories is definitely quite. The camp is the kingdom of hunger and malnutrition.

All prisoners are required to work. In the Cachhonic Women’s Camp, for example, prisoners sewed military uniforms and objects of army uniforms: Vats, Tablets, Shoes, Leather Both. Since 1990. In Lagar, a knitted shop, whose products went for export to Japan. The working day in the camp lasted 18 hours, and in recent weeks before the New Year, when it was necessary to perform a plan for any price by the end of the year, the working day became generally 20-hour [10a, # 12, with.140, 144; # 1, with.103].

Although all the witnesses left the camps before the start of the food crisis, which struck North Korea at the beginning of the nineties, the constant hunger was already part of the daily life of prisoners. Hunger was used as a means of control: the food was the main form of encouragement, and the deprivation of it is the main form of punishment.

How does Sun Sun testify, which was serving a sentence in the women’s camp in Cachekon, there are about 1990. The following system existed. If the prisoner did not fulfill the norm, the next day its 300-grams decreased to 240 grams. If the failure has continued for more than 4 days in a row, the lads have declined even more, up to 210 grams [10a, with.138].

Of course, the official soldering is not enough to survive, so hunger and related diseases (first of all – Pellagra) mowed prisoners even in relatively prosperous eighties. To survive, people are forced to collect roots, grass, hunting on rats and mice. About mice and rats as the main source of animal protein in the nutrition of prisoners mention almost all who had to visit the North Korean camp. Kan Chol Hwan says: "If I were then not to catch with them and did not eat mice, frogs, I would be already in the best world" [8, with.26]. He fills himself Chol: "Although the political prisoners work hard, they do not see meat, and rat meat for them is an important preventive medicine, a means of combating hunger" [6, with.178].

Grueling Labor Mode Supported Terror. Punishments are diverse. Open resistance or escape is punished with death, and the execution is carried out in public, in the presence of other prisoners (a description of such execution by one of the former concludes cm.: [7, with.30-41]). Most of the softer punishments are associated with a reduction in the already maizer soldering. In the Cachhonic camp for violations of the regime, conclusion in the Caracerer had a period of up to 10 days, during which the prisoners received only 90 grains per day. How does Sun writes OK, "Prisoners were afraid of Caracera more death" [10a, with.138].

Of course, no accurate information about the scale of repressions and the number of convicts is not. There are different estimates, including those based on aerial photography of camps, reporting messages, foreign embassy information. The most curious thing is that the spread of numbers in these estimates is not large, almost everyone recognize that currently in Korean camps is somewhere from 100 to 150 thousand people, most of which are not criminal, and political criminals [4, with.24]. A few mansion is the assessment, which, without references to sources, expressed P.Kagan, who rated this amount of 300-400 thousand, but he, apparently, included in the number of prisoners and those who are in "Areas of action NO.149" and B "Special areas of dictatorship objects".

The first wave of terror fell on the country at the end of the fifties, and was connected with the departure of Kim Il Sennia from the orientation of the USSR. The victims of repression then often became experts who were prepared in the USSR and, by virtue of this, with skepticism, with respect to many ideas Kim Il Sayna, and indeed, as they talked to Korea, "infected revisionist ideology". In the late 1950s, Kim Il Saint recalled all Korean students from the Soviet Union. Further fate turned out to be sad. As the author of these lines told the former Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the DPRK Kan San Ho, who later had to escape in the USSR, for the return students, a special camp was carefully prepared, in which their thorough check was carried out for several months. Found out how much they underwent the influence of the XX Congress of the CPSU and the revisionist politics of Khrushchev. With those who turned out to be ideologically persistent, entered graciously: they were sent to the village for labor re-education, at the end of which they allowed to work in the specialty. Less persistent was waiting for a prison, the most unfortunate simply shot.

I must say that some of the students foresaw such a development of events and refused to return to their homeland. At the insistence of Yu.V.Andropov, then – the heads of the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU, these non-repudents were granted political asylum and, with time, Soviet citizenship. In response to this, North Korean special services launched a real hunt for potential disgruntled territory. In particular, they made an unsuccessful attempt to steal Ho Zhine (afterwards he acquired a well-deserved fame as a journalist and the author of one of the first books on the history of North Korea). Ho Zhin managed to run by jumping out of the window of the embassy. Not always, however, everything ended so safely. At least one of the dissidents – a student of the Moscow Conservatory – there was a broad daylight of the day captured by the Korean special group in the center of Moscow, shovel into the car and exported to Pyongyang, where he hardly remained alive. In general, active activity in caution of non-returns, which was then unfolded by Korean special services in the Soviet territory, acquired such a scope that it took personal intervention.WITH.Khrushchev to stop her. At the insistence of N.WITH.Khrushcheva North Korean ambassador, in which the abduction mentioned above occurred, was recalled in Pyongyang [2].

Probably makes sense to tell here about what a person may be in the North Korean prison. Now this kind of information can be easily found in numerous rejoicing of the faders published in South Korea. However, I would like to start my story with the cases that I found out during my stay in North Korea, conversations with North Koreans and worked in Pyongyang by Soviet diplomats. I must say that about such cases mentioned more than once.

Here is one of the similar episodes that the Soviet diplomat told me. On the Bucchinsky aluminum plant in 1977 there was one young engineer, a person capable and working. He closely fell asleep with our specialists, began to take literature from them, had a negligence several times to express his sympathy for the USSR and even somehow with witnesses said that "USSR needs to learn". He was arrested and publicly shot, as they explained to the workers, for "Low-planned foreigner".

Practice of public executions for overlooking the Soviet experience or people, and indeed, for any positive feedback on scientific and technical or cultural achievements of other countries, was particularly widespread in the sixties, during the struggle for approval "Juche" – Korean identity. So, according to one retired officer who served in Korean aviation and subsequently fled to the USSR, in 1960-1961 he had two people in the squadron. One of them – for the fact that during the flight, the fuel supply system was faced (accused of hydration), and the other – for unnecessarily approving memories of Soviet military advisers and a high assessment of their professional qualities [3].

However, in the early 1960s, North Korean courts were especially generous for death sentences. The mode has tightened and it was necessary to pool all the traces of the past "liberalism", albeit very relative. So Kon Thak Ho, which served in the early 1960s in the North Korean police, recalls, as in 1962. In Hamhane, after the indicative process, a student was shot, guilty only that the local police caught her in the evening in the Locker together with the Beloved (young people did not talk about the works of Kim Il Senya, but were indulging in more enjoyable classes, which in the Ultrapuritan North Korea were considered immoral) [15, C.82-87] <* 2>.

Another case about which the author has become known during his stay in Pyongyang in 1984/85., happened with a university student, whose mother worked as a cutter in Atelier. Once it was arrested right at work and no one had seen her more. Three days and a student, and his brothers and sisters were ordered to go to the village. A few months later, a person who arrived from a long-range district brought a letter in which this student wrote about his life in the link. His family and his family have to work for 12-14 hours a day, and in their dysphech built houses even does not melt ice. Apparently, this family was administratively sent to "Resolution NO District.149" or "Special area of ​​dictatorship objects".

A lot of examples of this kind can be found in the memories of those living now in South Korea of ​​the DPRK.

As the Aclain of Choli remembers, in the camp, where he served as a guard, there was a 27-year-old Khan Chin Dock. She got there at the age of only 7 years, in the case of his father Khan BN Su, rural veterinarian. At the beginning of the seventies, her father, who treated a pig from the peasant, said: "In this world, even pigs cannot grow as they want". The peasant woman, sawing in this evapoam against the authorities, reported, and the next day the political police officer came to Khan Ben Su. Here the veterinarian made a second mistake, which finally determined not only his fate, but also the fate of his family. He called the North Korean leader "Kim Il Saint", Without using no compulsory title ("Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Saint", for example). He was arrested, subjected to torture, signed all the necessary recognition in conspiratorial and reactionary activities, and was shot, while his wife and two daughters got into a concentration camp. His wife died there, and her daughter had fate tragically: after one of the guards lost places on charges in connection with her (connection with concluded women – an ideological crime), friends "victim" Grabbed her, raped, crippled, and achieved her shipment for underground work, which is generally equivalent to the mortal sentence [5].

Kan Chol Hwan remembers the shoot of the camp, who made two former soldiers. The reason for their arrest was the fact that they sang South Korean songs that were learned while they served on the 38th parallels. Subsequently, soldiers managed to run and hide from chase for several months. However, as a result, their escape was also over, like most of the shoots: they were captured and hanged in the presence of the prisoners specially collected for this (among whom Kan Chol Hwan himself) [7, with.33].

However, such examples can be brought infinitely. It is clear that a noticeable part of those people who are now in North Korean prisons, got there because of misconduct, which in no other country would be considered crimes. It is also clear that the fact that the other, also considerable, part of North Korean prisoners at all, nothing reprehensible (even on very paranoid standards of the Pyongyang regime) did not accomplish, but turned out to be there on the principle of family responsibility, which is carried out in the DPRK in life with a sequence that does not have in modern The world is analog.

It would be appropriate to say a few words and about the repressive organs themselves. The formation of the North Korean repressive apparatus began shortly after the country’s liberation. Already in the composition of 1945 created in the fall. Administrative Committee 5 [North Korean] provinces existed a People’s Security Bureau, the head of which became the old associate in Kim Il Song on partisan fighting in Manchuria Chkhve. After the proclamation of the DPRK, the Ministry of Internal Affairs was engaged in political school, in which since September 1948. existed "Department of Special Information", Which in July 1949. Received name "Department of Political Security" [11, with.121] (according to some data, this department was also created earlier, in February 1948., That is, even before the formal proclamation of the DPRK [10, with.706]<* 3>).

The first Minister of Internal Affairs of the DPRK was the brilliant speaker, in the past – a large figure of the PDA and the trustee of Mao Tse-Duna Pak Il ya, but the political cheese from the very beginning was subordinate to the Pan Hack CE – Soviet Korean, a professional lawyer, in the past – an employee of the prosecutor’s office G.Kzyl-Orda. This man played a sinister role in North Korean history, becoming one of the main organizers of the repression of the 50-60s. The fact that Ban Hack CE enjoyed and enjoys unlimited confidence in Kim Il Shenya testifies to the fact that he subsequently not only did not share the fate of his too much knew the Soviet colleagues and Beria, but also today continues to occupy one of the most important posts in the cavaluation system of North Korea, now for two decades (from 1972.) As the Chairman of the Supreme Court of the DPRK, and the only Korean of Soviet origin, which is part of the selected on the last, VI Congress of the TPK of the Central Committee of the Party [12, with.121].

In March 1951. "Department of Political Security" and some other departments of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which were engaged in both ordinary and political languages ​​were allocated to a special ministry of public security, at the head of which Ban Hack Ce. However, then this ministry existed for long and in October 1952. It was again merged from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and after this merger, Ban Hack Sea took the post of Minister of the Interior, replacing Pak Il u, who was destined to become a victim of repression. The Ministry of Public Security was revived in October 1962. At first, it focused in his hands control over the activities of both the usual police and the political suck authorities, which submitted to the special "Department of Political Security". In February 1973. This department was turned into an independent Ministry of Political Protection of the State. In April 1982. Another reform took place, rather unusual: the Ministry of Political Protection of the State, which since that time was just known as the Ministry of Protection of the State (Could), became (as well as the military department, and the Ministry of Public Security) of the party body submitted directly to the Central Committee of the TPK.

On the structure could be a good information in open literature, of course, extremely few<*4>. It is known that 16 departments (Cook) and 4 management (CHM) are part of its central office. Each province and every country has its own management of political security. In addition, in the army there is a system, approximately similar to the Soviet system of special departments, the staff of the security service is both in parts and in the divisions right up to the company.

The tasks of administrative control over the population could decide not one, but in close contact with the Ministry of Public Security (Mob), which is subject to the usual police. Most of the simple Koreans deal with CHII only in cases where they are not particularly lucky, while everyday control over their lives is entrusted to the Mob authorities. It is they who register the population, issue permits for travel around the country, it is to them that daily information about behavior, actions, statements of most Koreans flow [11, C.123 and SL.].

Unique, but at the same time and having deep roots in the Far Eastern tradition, a feature of a political control system that exists in modern North Korean society is the Institute of Circular Lap. The entire population of North Korea is divided into the so-called folk groups "Inminban", which are combined at the place of residence from twenty to fifty, and on average about forty families. This is usually either residents of a small quarter of rural houses, or a high-rise building, or even one entrance in such a house. At the head of each group there is an official who is responsible for everything that happens with the members of his subordinate "People’s Group". It is usually watching the wards of his wards vigilantly, because any of their big misconduct can cost him trouble. Call these officials – "Inminbangan", that is "Head of the People’s Group". According to his discharge members "People’s Group" must participate in all kinds of economic work, clean the territory. Pass B "folk groups" and meetings on which their non-working members – for the most part of the elderly aunt – study the ideas of Juche or listen to the stories about the greatness of Kim Il Sen.

However, the main task of these lower officials is control over the population entrusted to them. "Inminbangan", In particular, it can enter any of the wards to him apartments both in the afternoon and at night, every Korean, night at home, is obliged to contact "Inminbanchan", In submission of which the apartment has become overnight stay, present his documents, explain the cause of his appearance and get a written permission to stay overnight (for this "Folk group" There is a special grasbuch). Without the consent of this official, it is impossible to go to another city to relatives, about the departures on business trips should also be informed. Even students, arriving on vacation, are obliged to report it "Inminbangzhan". Power "Inminbaczhanov" Sure enough, in some cases they can even send unwanted from Pyongyang. In case someone from members "People’s Group" will make a particularly difficult political crime, then one member may be subject to one or another punishments. These system goes back to ancient times, to the era of legist experiments in China in N.NS.

Repressive apparatus and control over the population in North Korea

System role "Inminban" It is difficult to overestimate, for it provides the ability to carry out continuous control over all areas of the life of North Koreans. In many ways, this system is more effective than even the most extensive network of police informants, because the fact that secret agents have to act, by definition, secretly, and find some explanations of one or another to their actions or issues, it makes it difficult to work in many ways. "Inminbangan", On the contrary, it has the official right to control and ask questions, including those that police informant could not ask, not risking to be revealed. Of course, this does not mean that there are no informants in Korea – from, most likely, not enough, and "Voluntary" denunciation of power, as we have seen from the above examples, encourage.

Control over the population greatly facilitates the fact that the country’s movement is extremely limited. No special permission of the security authorities, no one has the right to go beyond their county. Ticket can be bought, only presenting this permission. Perrons railway stations are carefully fenced and often guarded by soldiers of internal troops, you can only go to the peer through the checkpoint by presenting armed watches (and if it happens in small stations, where they are not there, then the girl controller) his documents, a ticket and permission to control Travel. I myself had to see this permission – a small bluish leaf with a name, an indication of the institution, goals and duration of the trip. For an attempt to penetrate without this document, 15 days of forced work relies in the neighboring county and, of course, the waters of the previous place of residence. Naturally, the question arises: what about those who want to meet with relatives or friends living in a nearby county? For them there is a challenge system, security authorities issue a trip permission if there is an officially certified invitation from relatives.

Of course, the whole system is pursued, first of all, internal political tasks. She is partly aimed against the actions of South Korean and other intelligence services, but the main goal is to prevent dissatisfaction with the regime and stop the abundance of the ability to protest. Makes it impossible and escape from places of detention or desertion. Those three former prisoners who are now in South Korea, fled abroad after they were released from the places of detention, and argue that not a single case of a successful escape from North Korean prison is unknown [18, with.67].

but, "no thinness without good", And this unique, not hambitable in the world of the total system of total control is one good side result: it significantly reduces the crime rate. The fact is that in North Korea now it is almost impossible to hide from the authorities. First, it is impossible to buy a ticket and go to "An unknown direction", Secondly, the appearance of any suspicious will be immediately noticed "Inminbanchan". If adding to this card system is actually all types of goods that turns "free" Money in paper, and the severity of punishments, then it is clear why North Korea is a country with low crime (although, in the nineties, this situation began to change to the worst). Standing, however, consider the fact that Koreans in general, as the historical experience showed, including in South Korea, the people who are small to criminal activity. In the same South Korea, for example, the crime rate is many times less than, let’s say in the US, although poverty and even poverty there are incomparably more, and the structure of crime is completely different: if fraud, bribery, official and financial crimes, as well as All sorts of dies on household grounds are found quite often, the murders in order to robbery or robberies are extremely rare.

One of the most important tasks that the administrative and police control system is pursued in Korea is to provide "Sealing" Korean society, organization of hard control over information. Sale of free-setting receivers are prohibited in Korea: all sold (more precisely – outstanding on orders and coupons, as well as as "Gifts of the Great Leader") Receivers have a fixed setting on a wave of Pyongyang radio, and representatives of the MOB systematically carry out sudden raids at home receivers owners for the purpose of checking them. Even if Korean buys a receiver in a currency store or brings it from abroad, he is obliged to immediately pass it into public safety management for alteration, after which only ideologically proven Pyongyang broadcasting can be listened to. The presence of a non-accelerated receiver in itself is considered a crime. Another means of information control over the population is an extremely developed system of special systems in libraries. All foreign literature falls into special storage departments and (quite in the Spirit of Orwell) all Korean editions of more than 10- or 15 years ago, with the exception of purely technical, so North Koreans are deprived of the opportunity to follow the fluctuations of the line of the authorities in the old publication.

Of course, the Koreans are completely insulated and from those few foreigners that are in the country. Danger to be accused of "Spyware" so great that the group of foreigners on the street is literally excavated from the lease. I must say that there is foundations for such behavior, because any unauthorized contacts with foreigners are deadly dangerous. So living in South Korea An HC was in 1986. Arrested for a meeting with foreigners and held first a year and a half in the prison of the Ministry of Political Protection of the State, and then another 2 years – in "special area of ​​dictatorship objects" [eighteen]. Providing a tough information isolation that the current North Korean leadership is not without reason considers the key to preserve its regime (and possibly its own physical survival), also assigned to the repressive and police bodies.

As a result of the many-year-old activities of the North Korean authorities in the country, it was possible to create a slim system of total control and, perhaps, to realize the old dream of other utopists (and the nightmare of anti-dutopists) – to build a society in which all parties to the life of the individual, if not managed by the authorities, then at least they are known. And partly controlled. How effective is this system? The North Korean state has existed for half a century for which there are considerable changes in the world. This circumstance itself shows that the effectiveness of the North Korean system of political control (as well as closely associated with it, the system of ideological processing of the population) is sufficient. No matter how much the history of the North Korean state has released, it will always attract the attention of historians and sociologists precisely as a sample of a totally controlled society that has existed for quite a long time.

On the other hand, an effective system of police control and repression is important (although not the only one) a factor that allowed this society to exist so long. Stability is provided not only by the readiness of the regime to roam for the slightest manifestations of discontent. Its main features include total control over all sides of the lives of Koreans, carried out through the group system "Inminban" and in many ways wearing mutual character. Not only the change of place of work or residence, but also just movement in the country (and in many cases – and just a night spent outside the house) are impossible without approval by the authorities. Any types of assembly, even on the house, will be immediately taken to note, and the head of the folk group usually knows even a circle of dating all its wards. It is clear that in such a situation, activities even minimally organized opposition groups becomes impossible. In addition, the widespread application of the principle of family responsibility forces many dissatisfied, which may have risked, refrain from actions that could lead not only to their death, but also to the suffering of their families. Finally, the division of the population on hereditary groups, some of which are privileged, and others, on the contrary, discriminated, allows you to inhibit those that the origin allows you to consider potential enemies of the regime. All these features provide the North Korean regime to considerable stability, although it would be a serious simplification to assume that the ninons of Pyongyang was obliged to their political survival of Pyongyan for the communist regimes, only the effective work of the political police was obliged.

* 1. A good example of this can be found in the memoirs of Kim Pu Sona, the North Korean Delets, which was before that official of the Middle Hand. When he worked in the CNVON district, one of his tasks was the selection of those schoolchildren who could be allowed to admit. He describes the case when they refused to recommendations for a brilliant high school graduate, one of the top high school students. Reason for refusal: her grandfather until 1946. was a small landlord. Schoolgirl herself, by the way, did not know his grandfather, by that time he had long been dead [9, with.280 and SL.] * 2. Another similar case occurred relatively recently, in 1985., When in the presence of specially assembled leading North Korean actors for "Depraved behavior" An outstanding actress at In Khvey was shot – People’s Artist of the DPRK, the performer of the role of Chong Xan in the famous screening of this classical Korean story. However, the concrete cause of the execution of this bright and talented, though, indeed, and not distinguished by the sexual abbreviation of a woman, was the fact that due to the stupid accident during a love date the son of one of the rich Japanese koreans of the draft core orientation (see.: Ko n hwan. Pxhanyan 25 Sigan (25 o’clock Pyongyang). Seoul, Korvon, 1992. with.111-123). * 3. This is confirmed by the recently published document in the southern course of the North Korean Ministry of Interior, which is dated March 31, 1948. and on which there is, in particular, and the signature of Pan Hack CE as "Head of the Information Department" (Chonbocha Chochezhan) (document text cm. [13, with.420]). *4. Unlike the USSR, where in the years of confrontation with the United States, a great many exposure books about the CIA and the FBI, or the United States, in which a lot, even in the most gloomy tones, wrote about the KGB, the South Korean authorities are extremely reluctant to share with the public. that information about North Korean special services that they can not be. It is generally characteristic of South Korea, in which studies on a number of aspects of the history and modern life of North Korean society are actually under the unlawful ban.

Typical in this regard, released in Seoul in 1976. Notes Kon Thak Ho – hardly not the only officer of the North Korean security service, which switched to the south [15]. There are many small facts in these notes, but there is nothing almost nothing about. Apparently, the South Korean CIA, whose representatives were edited by the book, followed such information was not disclosed.

1. Interview with Kan San Ho. Leningrad, October 31, 1989. Kan San Ho – Soviet journalist and party worker, in 1945-1959. At work in the DPRK, held a number of posts: director of the Higher Party School, Deputy. Minister of Internal Affairs and DR.

2. Interview with B.NS.Tkachenko. Moscow, January 23, 1990. V.NS.Tkachenko – Soviet diplomat and party worker, from the beginning of the 1960s. and up to August events 1991. Worked in the Central Committee of the CPSU, in the Korean sector.

3. Interview with A.Son. Tashkent, January 23, 1991. A.Sleep – Son of a large North Korean figure Sleep Sica, leaving from the USSR. After the end of the Military School in 1953-1961. served in North Korean Air Force.

4. ORWELL’S NIGHTMARE: Human Rights in North Korea. The Heritage Lectures, # 394. Washington, Heritage Foundation, 1992.

5. Acorns Choli. Surgnant boy Hamns Sapsid. – "Hin Kos-to Komda". Seoul, Tana, 1996.

6. Acorns Choli. Chvi Kogi-hectare Yilkhan. – "Hin Kos-to Komda". Seoul, Tana, 1996.

7. Kan Chol Hwwan. Pucoshan Sonzo Inmine Chephan. – "Hin Kos-to Komda". Seoul, Tana, 1996.

eight. Kan Chol Hwwan. Ona Pukson Cheil KPKO-SIRN. – "Hin Kos-to Komda". Seoul, Tana, 1996.

nine. Kim Pu Son. NE-GA Phan Tonjugul. Seoul, Cappick Munza Ca, 1976.

ten. Pukhan Teschzhon. Seoul, 1974.

10A. Lee Sun OK. Bunch of chinese number of Svon-Yun "Akma Sogul" IOTTA. – Pukhan, 1996, # 8- # 12; 1997, # 1.

eleven. Lee Chong Hee. Pukhan Ron. Seoul, Munhns, 1987,

12. Pukhan Inhmn Sachzhon. Seoul, Ton Ilbo Sa, 1990.

13. Pukhan Mingju Thonail Undon Sa. PKANDO PCH ("The history of the democratic movement for the union in South Korea. Province of PKANDO"). Seoul, Pukhan Nguso, 1990.

fourteen. Pukhan Chhollam (North Korean Review). Seoul, 1985.

15. Kon Thak Ho. Kukka Chonchi Wayguk Nemak (behind the scenes of the Ministry of Political Protection of the State). Seoul, 1976.

16. Kan Sin Gi. Puchana Pan Cherzhev Serk-E Tahan Kochal (research of anti-government forces in North Korea). – Pukhan, 1990, # 9.

17. Pukna Shenhvalsan (Lifestyle of the North and South). Seoul, 1986.

eighteen. TKYKLL TOKCHE TECAN COOK SUNCHADEL IRKHE SALGO ITTIO (so live prisoners in "Special areas of dictatorship objects").- "Buchan", 1992, # 12.

Repressive apparatus and control over the population in North Korea

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